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NOTES 
Immunity Under the Speech or Debate Clause for 
Republication and from Questioning About Sources 
Gravel v. United States,1 which arose out of Senator Mike Gravel's 
attempt to publicize the Pentagon Papers,2 concerned the scope of 
the immunity conferred upon a legislator and his aide under article 
I, section 6, of the United States Constitution.3 This provision, com-
monly called the "speech or debate clause," provides that "for any 
Speech or Debate in either House, [United States Senators or Repre-
sentatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."4 Gravel is 
one of the few Supreme Court interpretations of this clause.5 
On June 29, 1971, the Senator called a late-night meeting of the 
Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public 
I. 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
2. Formally entitled History of the United States Decision-Making Process on Viet 
Nam Polic<>•• 
3. For law review treatments of the speech or debate immunity, see generally Ervin, 
The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congress and Independence, 59 VA. L. 
R.Ev. 175 (1973); Velvel, The Supreme Court Tramples Gravel, 61 KY. L.J. 525 (1973); 
Comment, Brewster, Gravel and Legislative Immunity, 73 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 125 (1973); 
Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV.LR.Ev. I, 189-201 (1972); Note, Black-
listing Through the Official Publication of Congressional Reports, 81 YALE L.J. 188 
(1971); Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: 
Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK 
L. R.Ev. I (1968); Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and Their Employees, 
77 YALE L.J. 366 (1967); Note, The Bribed Congressman's Immunity from Prosecution, 
75 YALE L.J. 335 (1965); Comment, Absolute Privilege as Applied to Investigators for 
Congressional Committees, 63 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 326 (1963); Oppenheim, Congressional 
Free Speech, 8 LoYOLA L. R.Ev. 1 (1956); Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional 
Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 960 (1951); Note, "They 
Shall Not Be Questioned •• . ": Congressional Privilege To Inflict Verbal Injury, 3 
STAN. L. R.Ev. 486 (1951); Field, The Constitutional Privileges of Legislators: Exemption 
from Arrest and Action for Defamation, 9 MINN. L. R.Ev. 442 (1925); Veeder, Absolute 
Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, IO COLUM. L. R.Ev. 
l3l (1910). 
4. The clause has its origins in the attempts by the English Parliament to exercise 
power over royal succession and religion. Cella, supra note 3, at 4-5. The first statutory 
recognition of the immunity of members of Parliament for speeches made in Parlia-
ment was contained in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2. As 
in the case of many other English political principles, the immunity took root in 
America in the eighteenth century. It was a matter of contention in the struggles 
between the royal governors and the colonial assemblies and between the English 
Parliament and the assemblies. Cella, supra, at 13-14. See also M. CLARKE, PARLIAMEN• 
TARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 12 (1943). Consequently, the privilege was 
explicitly recognized in the Articles of Confederation of 1777 and in several state 
constitutions. Cella, supra, at 14. For further treatment of the privilege's history, see 
C. WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE (1921); E. l\fAY, THE 
LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 42-66 (17th ed. 1964); Neale, 
The Commons' Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament, in TUDOR Snmrns 257 (R. Seton-
Watson ed. 1924). 
5. For other recent decisions, see Doe v. McMillan, 41 U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S., May 
29, 1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
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Works Committee, read a summary of the high points of the Papers, 
and then introduced all forty-seven volumes into the record. Two 
weeks later, in an effort to publicize the Papers further, Gravel's 
aide Leonard Rodberg began negotiations with various publishers, 
one of whom agreed to publish them.6 As a result of his activities, 
Rodberg was subpoenaed by a federal grand jury investigating the 
release and publication of the Papers.7 In moving to quash the sub-
poena, Rodberg argued that it violated his immunity under the 
speech or debate clause.8 Although Gravel was not himself sub-
poenaed, he obtained permission to intervene in the proceeding on 
Rodberg's motion. He then moved to quash the subpoena and to 
require the government to specify the questions it intended to ask 
Rodberg.9 
The district court refused to quash the subpoena, but it did 
issue a protective order prohibiting the government from asking 
Rodberg about activities undertaken at the Senator's direction and 
from asking any witness about Gravel's preparation for or conduct 
at the subcommittee meeting.10 It did not hold that private publica-
tion of the Papers would be privileged. The court of appeals affirmed, 
with only slight modification, the decision of the district court.11 
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that Gravel was immune 
from questioning about his actions at the subcommittee meeting12 
and that Rodberg shared this immunity.13 However, taking a narrow 
view of the speech or debate clause, the Court, in an opinion by 
Justice White, held that private republication was not within its 
protection and that both Gravel and Rodberg could be questioned 
about the source of their information (that is, how they obtained 
the Papers).14 These last two holdings provoked considerable contro-
versy on the Court and will be the focus of this Note. 
6. For a detailed discussion of the case's factual background, see S. UNGAR, THE 
PAPERS&: THE PAPERS (1972). 
7. The crimes in question were the retention of public properties or records with 
intent to convert them to the use of another or to convey them to another, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 641 (1970); the transmittal of national defense information, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1970); 
the removal of public records, 18 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970); and conspiracy to commit such 
offenses and to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). United States v. Doe, 
332 F. Supp. 930, 932 (D. Mass. 1971). 
8. Rodberg also argued that his first amendment rights were violated because 
questioning by the grand jury would reduce his ability to gather the confidential 
information necessary to his multiple roles as writer,.lecturer, and adviser to senators 
and congressmen. The trial court summarily rejected this contention. United States 
v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 932 (D. Mass. 1971). 
9. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 932 (D. Mass. 1971). 
10. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 938 (D. Mass. 1971). 
11. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1972). 
12. 408 U.S. at 615-16. 
13. 408 U.S. at 616-22. 
14. 408 U.S. at 622-29. 
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The rationale for the Court's decision on sources was simply 
that the speech or debate clause does not immunize a senator or his 
aide "from testifying at trials or grand jury proceedings involving 
third-party crimes where the questions do not require testimony 
about . . . a legislative act."rn ,vith respect to republication, the 
Court again stressed that the scope of the speech or debate clause was 
limited to legislative acts16 and concluded that "private publication 
by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in 
no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate . . . ."17 
Dissenting Justices Stewart,18 Douglas,19 and Brennan,20 who 
was joined in his dissent by Marshall and Douglas, all argued that a 
senator's sources should fall within the immunity conferred by the 
clause in order to safeguard clearly legislative conduct like speech-
making and voting in Congress. First, it was contended that congres-
sional sources of information would dry up if legislators could give 
no assurance of anonymity.21 Second, Justice Brennan felt that 
preparatory activity should be covered because "[i]t would accom-
plish little toward the goal of legislative freedom to exempt an offi-
cial act from intimidating scrutiny, if other conduct leading up to 
the act and intimately related to it could be deterred by a similar 
threat."22 Stewart made a third argument: the majority's ruling 
would allow the executive to threaten legislative independence, con-
trary to the basic purpose of the clause. A congressman could be 
15. 408 U.S. at 622. The Court took a narrow view of "legislative acts," noting that 
the fact that "Senators generally perform certain acts in their official capacity as 
Senators does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature." 408 U.S. at 625. 
In the Court's view, to receive the protection of the clause an act "must be an integral 
part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in 
committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or 
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitu-
tion places within the jurisdiction of either House." 408 U.S. at 625. 
16. 408 U.S. at 624-25. 
17. 408 U.S. at 625. The Court also relied on early English and American cases that, 
it claimed, showed that republication outside the legislative body was not protected by 
the speech or debate clause. See notes 125-38 infra and accompanying text. 
The Court noted that republication might involve the journal of proceedings 
clause of article I, section 5 (set out in note 88 infra), if authorized by the Senate 
itself, but did not indicate how this would affect its decision. See 408 U.S. at 626 n.16. 
Subsequently, in Doe v. McMillan, 41 U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S., May 29, 1973), the Court 
held that the Superintendent of Documents and the Public Printer were not immune 
from suit where the publication infringed on important personal rights even if the 
publication was ordered by Congress. The Court focused on the speech or debate 
clause and the possibility of official immunity, ignoring the journal of proceedings 
clause. 
18. 408 U.S. at 629-33. 
19. 408 U.S. at 633-48. 
20. 408 U.S. at 648-64. 
21. 408 U.S. at 630 (Stewart, J.), quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 758-59 
(1st Cir. 1972); 408 U.S. at 663 (Brennan, J.). 
22. 408 U.S. at 663. 
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subpoenaed by a vindictive executive to testify about information 
whether or not the informants had in fact committed crimes or had 
knowledge of crimes, since no limits have been imposed by the judi-
ciary on the broad investigatory powers of a grand jury.23 
Douglas and Brennan argued that republication should also be 
protected, because it is essentially legislative conduct even though it 
occurs outside the halls of Congress.24 The thrust of Brennan's and 
Douglas' separate arguments was that the majority, in allowing the 
grand jury to question Gravel and his aide about their dealings with 
private publishers, excluded from immunity an activity, central to 
the democratic system, that Woodrow Wilson called the "informing 
function."25 They emphasized that republication educated and in-
formed the citizenry about the workings of the executive and the 
federal government and fostered "public faith in the responsive-
ness of Govemment."26 
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR .ANALYSIS 
Until Gravel it had not been definitely decided whether the im-
munity of the speech or debate clause covered activity preparatory 
to conduct within Congress, such as gathering information for a 
congressional speech, or subsequent activity outside the legislative 
chambers, such as republication.27 The basic question cutting across 
these issues was whether a broad or narrow view was to be taken of 
the speech or debate clause. Coffin v. Coffin,28 the classic treatment of 
the scope of legislative immunity for speech or debate although it in-
volved a state constitutional provision stated that "the article ought 
not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it 
may be answered."29 Since Coffin, federal courts have framed the 
scope of the clause in terms of whether the activity is "legislative" 
or "nonlegislative."30 
Despite its wording, the clause has never been confined literally 
23. 408 U.S. at 631-32. 
24. 408 U.S. at 636-37 (Douglas, J.), 649 (Brennan, J.). 
25. w. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303-04 (1885), quoted with approval 
by Justice Douglas, 408 U.S. at 639, and Justice Brennan, 408 U.S. at 650-51. See Wat-
kins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957). 
26. 408 U.S. at 651-52 (Brennan, J.). See also 408 U.S. at 639-41 (Douglas, J.). 
27. Cella, supra note 3, at 36, expressed this uncertainty in 1968: 
But even where the privilege doctrine is more narrowly phrased in terms of 
speech and debate, innumerable practical difficulties in the application of the 
doctrine can readily be foreseen. Does the privilege extend to all of the language 
and actions of legislators serving on a legislative committee? ... And what of a 
legislator, not specifically authorized or directed by any vote of the legislature, who 
conducts an inquiry of his own to acquire information to enable him to discharge 
his legislative duties in a proper manner? 
28. 4 Mass. 1 (1808). The case is discussed at length in Cella, supra note 3, at 18-30. 
29. 4 Mass. at 27. 
30. E.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 514-16 (1972). 
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to "Speech or Debate in either House." Instead, courts have taken 
into account a variety of factors in delineating its limits. Foremost, 
of course, are the purposes of the clause. Of these, the most often 
mentioned is the facilitation of the performance of legislative tasks,31 
a rationale similar to that given for the immunity afforded the offi-
cers and employees of the executive branch.32 The second purpose, 
and the one most in keeping with the clause's historical origins, is 
to safeguard the independence of the legislature as a branch of gov-
ernment coequal with the executive and judicial branches.33 
The doctrine of legislative immunity is also related to the 
broader legal problem of judicial respect for the separation of 
powers.34 There is a historical judicial deference to the power of the 
legislature to discipline its own members.35 Justice Stewart, in his 
dissent in Gravel, relied on this in arguing that Congress, not the 
courts, should punish legislators for withholding information ac-
quired during their information-gathering activities.36 Additionally, 
the general rule against inquiry by other branches into legislative 
motives37 was discerned by Justice Frankfurter to be part of the 
rationale underlying the speech or debate clause.38 
31. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969): "The purpose of the 
protection afforded legislators is not to forestall judicial review of legislative action but 
to insure that legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of 
their legislative tasks by being called into court to defend their actions." See also 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). 
32. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1959). 
33. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1965) (Harlan, J.): "The 
legislative privilege, protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive 
and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of the 'practical security' for 
insuring the independence of the legislature." James Wilson, one of the members of 
the Committee on Detail that was responsible for inserting the clause into the Consti-
tution, also recognized the relationship between the privilege and legislative inde-
pendence: "In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to dis-
charge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he 
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the 
resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may 
occasion offence." THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). 
34. See Note, 77 YALE L.J. 366, supra note 3, at 385-86. See generally Scharpf, 
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 
(1966). 
35. To some extent, the association of the speech or debate clause with the separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine came about because of the special respect of the English 
courts for Parliament's plenary power and judicial tradition. "It is by no means an 
exaggeration to say that these judicial characteristics colored and influenced some of 
the great struggles over privilege in and out of Parliament to the very close of the 
nineteenth century .... Nowhere has the theory that Parliament is a court ... per-
sisted longer than in the history of privilege of Parliament .•.. " C. W1rrKE, supra 
note 4, at 14. 
36. 408 U.S. at 632. 
37. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 208-21 (1962). 
38. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). However, it can be argued that 
the reasons against judicial inquiry into legislative motive do not apply to inquiry 
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Despite frequent statements that the clause should be construed 
broadly to effect its purposes, countervailing interests have been rec-
ognized in historical limitations on the scope of the immunity.30 
Legislators have always been prone to abuse the privilege of their 
office;40 unfortunately, the speech or debate clause has protected 
some legislators from being punished for these abuses. The slander-
ous remarks made by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the early 1950's 
constituted such flagrant abuse of the privilege that consideration was 
given to amending the clause.41 The continuation of the immunity, 
even for speech that the speaker knows to be false, is apparently 
based on the theory, articulated by Judge Prettyman in Barsky v. 
United States,42 that the "individual hurt" is overbalanced by "the 
public necessity for untrammeled freedom of legislative . . . ac-
tivity. "43 Nonetheless, when individual or public interests have been 
harmed by the conduct of legislators outside of Congress, the courts 
have readily enforced criminal and civil sanctions.44 In addition, the 
rights of individuals have been vindicated in suits against the em-
ployees who implement policies of the legislators outside of Con-
gress, even though the congressmen themselves could not be sued 
for enacting the policies. 45 
The tendency of the judiciary to confine immunity to "things 
generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in 
relation to the business before it"46 may be more than an effort to 
stay as close as possible to the language of "Speech and Debate." 
Delineating the limits of the clause in this manner probably repre-
sents a compromise between divergent interests. In balancing these 
interests the courts have given primary significance to voting and 
speeches within the legislative chambers. Unfortunately, like the 
courts before it, the Gravel court contented itself only with broad 
statements about the clause. It neither detailed specifically the inter-
ests to be served by the clause, nor indicated precisely what weight 
into an individual legislator's motives, potentially at issue in a case like Gravel. See, 
e.g., Note, 75 YALE L.J. 335, supra note 3, at 340. See also text accompanying note 52 
infra. 
39. See Comment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 125, supra note 3, at 126-29. 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955); Burton v. United 
States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906); May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United 
States v. Dietrich, 126 F. 664 (C.C.D. Neb. 1904). Perhaps in recognition of this problem, 
Congress has delegated the responsibility for crimes such as bribery to the courts for 
the past one hundred years. See Note, 75 YALE L.J. 335, supra note 3, at 341. 
41. See Yankwich, supra note 3, at 973-77. 
42. 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948). 
43. 167 F.2d at 250. 
44. See cases cited in note 40 supra. 
45. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 41 U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S., May 20, 1973); Powell v. 
McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). 
46. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880). 
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is to be given to these interests in relation to competing considera-
tions. Furthermore, the Court failed to define clearly the proper role 
of the judiciary in adjudicating conflicts between different branches 
of the government and the place that the clause must necessarily have 
in defining this role.47 
The thesis of this Note is that the Court's imprecision was more 
than a missed opportunity to clarify the underlying rationale of the 
limitations on immunity, for it led the Court to restrict the scope 
of immunity unwisely in one important respect. The application of 
the clause to Gravel's activities at the subcommittee meeting and to 
his aide, to the extent Rodberg was engaged in legislative conduct, 
were unexceptionable. Moreover, although the bases for the Court's 
limitation could have been discussed more adequately, its refusal 
to extend the immunity to private republication was not ill-founded, 
either in terms of the competing interests at stake or in terms of the 
historical scope of the clause. However, it appears that the majority 
erred in refusing to apply the immunity to questioning about a legis-
lator's sources. 
II. SHOULD LEGISLATORS AND THEIR AIDES BE IMMUNE 
FROM QUESTIONING A.BOUT THEIR SOURCES? 
The majority never made clear the basis for its ruling that con-
gressmen are not immune from questioning about their sources of 
information. This may have been due to the fact that the issue was 
not raised in the petitions for certiorari or in the written briefs and 
was only tangentially discussed at oral arguments.48 In any case, the 
majority's conclusion is not entirely inconsistent with the traditional 
interpretation of the scope of the immunity. Despite Justice Bren-
nan's argument to the contrary,49 the ruling is not inconsistent with 
United States v. ]ohnson,w in which the Supreme Court held that a 
47. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (prosecution of former senator 
for solicitation and acceptance of bribes), probably represents the most complete 
judicial discussion of the various factors relevant to determining the proper limits of 
the speech or debate clause. In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that the 
immunity afforded by the clause was not always a benign force and that it was often 
subject to abuse. 408 U.S. at 517. But the Court reasoned that the immunity was not 
applicable to Senator Brewster because no inquiry into legislative acts was "necessary 
for the government to make out a prima facie case." 408 U.S. at 525. It also down-
played the threat of a substantial increase in the power of the executive and judicial 
branches over the legislative because it felt that there was very little historical evi-
dence of the existence of the threat and that certain elements of the American system-
the free press and the vigilance of the public-would not allow such a state of affairs. 
408 U.S. at 523-24. Also, the Court expressed skepticism about the willingness and 
ability of the legislative branch to punish its own members for misconduct occurring 
outside Congress. 408 U.S. at 518-20. 
48. 408 U.S. at 630 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part). 
49. 408 U.S. at 662-63. 
50. 383 U.S. 169 (1966). This case is discussed in Cella, supra note 3, at 31-37. 
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congressman who accepted a bribe to make a speech in the Congress 
was immune from prosecution. According to Brennan, questioning 
about sources should not be allowed in Gravel, just as the bribery 
prosecution was not allowed in Johnson, because close scrutiny of 
conduct leading up to legislative acts would effectively diminish 
legislative freedom. 51 However, it could be argued that criminal acts 
of third parties, which were involved in Gravel though not in John-
son, can be investigated by a grand jury without investigating the 
legislative motives of the legislator. The Johnson Court did appear 
to rest its decision on the impropriety of investigating legislative 
motives, finding that the clause protects them from scrutiny.52 
Nevertheless, if it is assumed that the purposes of the speech or 
debate clause are to preserve the balance of power between the three 
branches of government and to encourage knowledgeable and effec-
tive legislative activity,53 two arguments made by the dissents in 
Gravel deserve serious consideration. First, questioning legislators 
about their sources of information may directly deter legislative 
activity. To begin with, the possibility of a subsequent investigation 
into a legislator's acquisition of information may deter the legislator 
from using the information in a speech and thereby act as a con-
straint on his behavior. This would be especially likely if the legis-
lator is unwilling to risk harm to his source. In addition, as Justice 
Stewart pointed out, this deterrent effect is magnified by the poten-
tial for abuse by grand juries that has resulted from the relaxed rules 
governing their investigations.54 
Second, questioning legislators about their sources may make 
sources unwilling to provide the information necessary for the effi-
cient performance of legislative duties. This argument is analogous 
to that rejected by the Court in Branzburg v. Hayes,55 which held 
that newsmen have no immunity from questioning about those of 
their sources who are allegedly involved in criminal activities. In 
both cases, those who sought immunity argued that it should attach 
51. 408 U.S. at 662-63. 
52. 383 U.S. at 177, 180-85. 
53. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra. 
54. 408 U.S. at 631-32. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). "In 
recent years, •.• the federal grand jury has assumed a broad investigative role and 
a corresponding potential for conduct which may result in embarrassment, infamy, and 
reprisal to innocent individuals." Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 
(1972). 
This potential for abuse could be considerably reduced by allowing a legislator to 
obtain a protective order limiting a grand jury's questioning when it can be shown 
that the investigation is being conducted in bad faith or for the purpose of disrupting 
the legislator's activities. The Court has suggested this remedy would be available to 
a newsman if he were harassed by a grand jury. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-
08 (1972). 
55. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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to constitutionally protected freedoms of expression,56 and, in both 
cases, the argument assumed that the access to information necessary 
to exercise those freedoms would not be available unless the im-
munity of the sources that supply information could be assured. 
However, Branzburg should not be dispositive, for there is greater 
justification for the immunity in the case of legislators than in the 
case of newsmen. 57 Legislators tend to be more responsive to the 
public interest because they are subject to the control of fellow legis-
lators, through the rules of legislative bodies, and of the public, 
through its use of the ballot.58 Selected by the people to be the 
nation's leaders, they arguably have character attributes that make 
them likely to use the information for productive ends.59 Further-
more, although it may be argued that availability of information to 
all is important for the formation of public policies in a democracy, 
it is particularly crucial that those who make the actual decisions 
have access to all necessary information.6° Finally, the fact that legis-
lators, unlike newsmen, are specifically accorded immunity in the 
text of the Constitution is of great weight; there is no problem of 
justifying the granting of immunity to one special group, as there 
was in Branzb urg. 61 
Three questions must be addressed in order to evaluate the 
above two arguments. First, is the type of information provided by 
covert sources important? second, is there in fact a connection be-
tween the immunity and the availability of the needed information? 
and, third, even if there is such a relationship, should the immunity 
be denied because of stronger competing interests? 
It appears that the kind of information provided by these sources 
is important if the two goals facilitated by the speech and debate 
clause are to be adequately served. For Congress to perform its 
tasks properly, it must have access to all empirical data necessary 
to chart the wisest legislative courses.62 As a unanimous Supreme 
56. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 615; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 
679-80. 
57. See Comment, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 125, supra note 3, at 149. 
58. See Yankwich, supra note 3, at 976-77. 
59. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, supra note 3, at 198 n.46. 
60. 408 U.S. at 630 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part). See also 408 U.S. at 663 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Comment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 125, supra note 3, at 149. 
61. In Branzburg the Court noted: "Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define 
those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege . . . • The informative 
function asserted by representatives of the organized press ... is also performed by 
lectures, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists." 408 U.S. 
at 704-05. See Comment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 125, supra note 3, at 149. 
62. Because of the widespread practice of classifying information in the executive 
brancl1, sec Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil 
Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REv. ll30, 1200-02 (1972) (hereinafter Developments-National 
Security], disclosure of most of the information that Congressmen are likely to desire 
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Court recognized in McGrain v. Daughtery: 63 "A legislative body 
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information 
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect 
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the 
requisite information-which is not infrequently true-recourse 
must be had to others who do possess it."64 The legislature also has 
the important role, as the watchdog of the executive branch, of en-
suring that legislative directives are carried out.60 As ·woodrow Wil-
son said: "[q]uite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of 
administration.''66 
Furthermore, outside information may play an important role 
in maintaining the balance of power between the branches of govern-
ment. 67 The executive, as the operational branch of government, has 
primary knowledge of its own policies and of the manner in which 
they are being implemented; the legislature, which must oversee 
and evaluate, has the burden of uncovering the information that the 
executive does not voluntarily disclose.68 This is of considerable sig-
nificance given the tendency of the executive to supply voluntarily 
only information that reflects favorably on its proposals or opera-
tions, 69 and given the recent transfer of many operational functions 
from the Congress to the executive.70 The resultant legislative power-
lessness will also harm Congress' relative influence with the citizenry; 
in President Truman's words, "an uninformed Congress surely will 
forfeit a large portion of the respect and confidence of the people."71 
If this information is necessary to serve the purposes of the 
and would be unable personally to obtain is likely to be a criminal act. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 793 (1970). 
63. 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
64. 273 U.S. at 174-75. 
65. See generally, W. KEEFE &: M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 16-19 
(2d ed. 1968); S. BAILEY, THE NEW CONGRESS 86-88 (1966). 
66. W. WILSON, supra note 25, at 297. 
67. See note 33 supra. Even if this information only aids Congress in enacting legis-
lation, it can play an important role in maintaining a balance of power between the 
executive and the legislative branches. See J. ROBINSON, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-
MAKING 173 (rev. ed. 1967): "Essential to the larger objective of the check-and-balance 
mechanism is the operation of Congress as a constructive or positive instrument of 
national policy. Congress can, of course, check the executive and judiciary by negative 
acts-that is, by mere amending or legitimating decisions. However, we expect Con-
gress also to balance the other two branches by proposing its original, creative solu-
tions to both old and new problems" (emphasis original). 
68. See Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1210. Because the 
executive branch presently has a greater ability to bring information together, it will 
inevitably be the primary congressional source of information. J. ROBINSON, supra 
note 67, at 178-79. 
69. See Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1210. 
70. See E. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 2 (2d rev. ed. 1956). 
71. Hearings Pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18 Before the Joint Comm. on the Organiza-
tion of Congress, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 908 n.3 (1945). 
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clause, it must next be asked whether immunity for sources is needed 
to gather information. Arguably, information derived from inside 
sources is of relatively little importance. Although no empirical data 
are available, even if the legislative immunity applied, inside sources 
might be unlikely to supply important data to legislators because of 
other available outlets. Newsmen, for example, are initially more 
accessible than legislators and are more interested in inside crime 
stories that appeal to reader interest. More important, newsmen 
have a greater opportunity to cultivate networks of sources because 
of their nonofficial status. 
However, in an important group of recent incidents involving 
the transmittal of information from within the executive, inside 
sources have provided considerable information to legislators. There 
have been many instances in which legislators have received tips 
from lower or middle level executive officials who might have other-
wise been deterred by the threat of a grand jury investigation.72 The 
information disclosed has been qualitatively, if not quantitatively, 
significant, for it has aided the Congress in playing its watchdog role 
and has helped to redress the imbalance of power caused by con-
gressional ignorance about the workings of the rest of the govern-
ment. Although never empirically proved, it seems that an inside 
informant would be more likely to divulge information if his ano-
nymity could be unqualifiedly guaranteed.73 
It may also be argued that immunity from questioning about 
sources is not essential because Congress has alternative mechanisms 
for acquiring information. Its most potent means of acquiring in-
formation is the legislative investigation.74 Additionally, through its 
various powers-over appropriations and over the ratification of 
treaties, for example-Congress can coerce those who have necessary 
information.75 Finally, if necessary, Congress could completely elimi-
nate the criminal laws against the release or receipt of the kind of 
data that it needs to perform its legislative functions properly.76 If 
72. The leak of the Pentagon Papers is itself one example. Another occurred when 
Ernest Fitzgerald informed Congress of the cost overruns on the C-5A cargo plane. 
See Landauer, Pity Him Who Tells of Cost Overruns, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1970, at 22, 
cols. 4-6. 
73. See 408 U.S. at 630 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part). 
74. See genernlly Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory 
Power, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 3 (1959). 
75. See Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional 
Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477, 486 (1956): "Congressional control over appropriations and 
legislation is an excellent guarantee that the executive will not lightly reject a Con-
gressional request for information, for it is well aware that such a rejection increases 
the chances of getting either no legislation or undesired legislation." 
76. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, supra note 3, at 199. See also United States v. 
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524 (1972): "If we underestimate the potential for harassment, 
the Congress, of course, is free to exempt its Members from the ambit of the federal 
bribery laws . . . ." 
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these threats are effective, the importance of encouraging inside in-
formers is considerably lessened. 
_ Upon examination of these alternative means of obtaining infor-
.. mation, however, it becomes clear that informers may still play a 
strong role in ensuring that all important data is available to con-
gressmen. Unless Congress is apprised of certain developments by 
inside sources, it will not know what questions to ask in investiga-
tions or whether the answers it receives are correct and complete.77 
For the same reason, dependence upon those whom it is questioning 
also hinders Congress' ability to obtain information through the 
coercive use of its powers over appropriations and treaties. Addi-
tionally, the effectiveness in uncovering information of even a focused 
investigation can be considerably diminished by the exercise of 
executive or fifth amendment privileges.78 Moreover, those who 
break the old laws are often best qualified to provide information 
about the ineffectiveness of those laws and the need for reform. A 
good example is the Pentagon Papers incident itself.79 
Changing the disclosure laws themselves is not a satisfactory 
alternative, for an effective change would depend upon the co-
operation of the majority of the legislators, while the clause, which 
protects legislators as individuals, guarantees members with a minor-
ity viewpoint access to information so that they too can intelligently 
advocate their views. Their access to sources should be constitu-
tionally, not legislatively, protected. 
The third ques1:ion deals with whether countervailing considera-
tions militate against an immunity for questioning about sources. 
Both the orderly and efficient administration of justice and the inter-
ests protected by the laws violated by the third party would be 
served by the testimony of the legislator. Since early in the develop-
ment of English law it has been recognized that the basic interest 
promoted by the duty to testify at judicial proceedings is the full 
ascertainment of facts.80 In the Gravel context, disclosure of all the 
facts is important to aid a grand jury to fulfill its dual role of in-
vestigating crimes and protecting the accused until the charges are 
77. As Senator J. W. Fulbright said in response to the U.S. Ambassador to Laos' 
failure to mention large-scale bombing missions in Laos: "We do not know enough to 
ask you these questions unless you are willing to volunteer the information. There is 
no way for us to ask you questions about things we don't know you are doing." 
SENATE Co111111. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 92D CONG., lsr SESS., SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AS 
A PROBLEM: IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY 30 (Comm. Print 1970). 
78. See generally Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L. 
REv. 1044, 1287-333 (1965). See also Ervin, supra note 3, at 191-93. 
79. See Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-The 
Pentagon Papers Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter Information Policies Hearings]. 
80. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confi• 
dential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 319 (1970). 
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found to be credible.81 Because of the existence of other testimony, 
that of legislators will rarely be determinative in either grand jury 
proceedings or in civil and criminal trials. But the invocation of the 
speech or debate immunity for questioning about sources will always 
result in some damage to the interest in full disclosure. 
Moreover, the interests represented by the specific laws in ques-
tion will always be sacrificed somewhat by extending the immunity. 
Although the laws involved may be meant to protect interests in life 
and property, in a case where legislative immunity is invoked the 
interests will most often be, like those in Gravel, designed to pro-
tect what one ·writer has called the executive's right of privacy.82 
Despite all that has been said recently about the "people's right to 
know," it is almost universally conceded that the executive may have 
a legitimate need for secrecy83 with regard to some of its various 
functions, such as military responsibilities in both war and peace,84 
orderly diplomacy,85 the promotion of close and efficient working 
relationships among government personnel, 86 and the mainte-
nance of the confidentiality of governmental files on individuals.87 
This need for secrecy is explicitly recognized in the Constitution,88 
and since the founding of the Republic presidents have successfully 
asserted their right to some executive nondisclosure.89 A variety of 
both statutory and informal means have been used to ensure secrecy: 
the hiring of trustworthy personnel, the use of codes and classifica-
81. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906). 
82. See generally Bishop, supra note 75. 
83. See generally Henkin, The Right To Know and the Duty To Withhold: The 
Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 271 (1971). 
84. Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1190-91. This secrecy is 
particularly necessary in the nuclear age because strategic advantages are often the 
result of technological information. Id. 
85. Bishop, supra note 75, at 478: "[T]he files of the State and Defense Depart-
ments are •.• full of records of conversations between the governments of the United 
States and other countries, the disclosure of which might benefit the political fortunes 
of the Congressmen who disclosed them in approximate proportion to its adverse 
effect on relations between the two countries.'' See also Secretary Rogers' News Con-
ference of July 1: The Duty of the Executive Branch To Protect the National Security, 
65 DEPT. STATE BULL. 78, 79-80 (1971). 
86. See Bishop, supra note 75, at 487-88; Developments-National Security, supra 
note 62, at 1192. 
87. See Bishop, supra note 75, at 487. Such files often contain derogatory and untrue 
information. Id. 
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and 
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment 
require secrecy • • . .'' 
The power to conduct foreign relations was given to the executive rather than to 
Congress, and a part in making treaties was given to the less numerous Senate rather 
than to the House, in part because of a need for secrecy. Henkin, supra note 83, at 
273-74. 
89. See generally Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 
1953-1960, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (1961). 
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tion systems, and the enactment of laws to protect secret informa-
tion. 90 Thus, there is a recognized interest in preventing the release 
of information presently concealed by the executive branch, an inter-
est that would be sacrificed to some extent by any impediment to the 
enforcement of security laws. 
But when the recipient of information is a legislator, this counter-
vailing consideration should not be determinative. It can fairly be 
assumed that there are few national enemies among congressmen.91 
Past experience suggests that Congressmen will seldom publicly re-
veal highly sensitive information in a way that would compromise 
any national interest.92 Furthermore, it is arguable that informants 
should be encouraged to give their information to legislators, rather 
than to newspapermen or others likely to disseminate it widely.03 
Finally, legislators need information about the enforcement of en-
acted laws to see whether these laws are serving their intended 
purposes. To the extent that the laws represent the public will, they 
only do so if they are operating in the way that the legislature ex-
pected them to operate. 
. It may be suggested that in each fact situation the judiciary 
should consider these competing interests before deciding whether 
to apply the immunity.94 The courts could simply balance the in-
terests in each case, as suggested by Justice Stewart in Gravel.95 Or, 
as advocated by Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg,96 the Court 
could in each instance require the prosecution to prove both that its 
interest in having the legislator testify about his sources is a compel-
ling one and that there are no alternative ways to acquire the infor-
mation. 
The two basic reasons given by the Court in Branzburg for re-
jecting these approaches also apply to Gravel. First, both methods 
would do little to encourage sources to divulge information to 
legislators, for an informant would never be certain that his anonym-
90. Henkin, supra note 83, at 275. For a description of the system used to classify 
secret information, see Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1198-205. 
91. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, supra note 3, at 198 n.46. 
92. See Information Policies Hearings, supra note 79, at 922 (statement of William 
Macomber). 
Besides Gravel's disclosure of the Pentagon Papers, the most serious case of con• 
gressional disclosure was Senator Burton K. Wheeler's revelation in 1941, while the 
operation was still in progress, that the Navy was occupying Iceland. See Bishop, supra 
note 75, at 486 n.41. 
The House of Representatives apparently has no rules that govern the handling 
of classified information, but the Senate rules allow expulsion of a Senator who re-
veals such information. Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1209. 
93. See Note, The Right of Government Employees To Furnish Information to 
Congress: Statutory and Constitutional Aspects, 57 VA. L. REv. 885, 906 (1971). 
94. See generally Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, supra note 3, at 198-201. 
95. 408 U.S. at 632. 
96. 408 U.S. at 739-40. 
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ity would be preserved.97 As the Court in Branzburg noted: "If news-
men's confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to be, 
the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the 
situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem."98 
Second, the judicial balancing approach raises problems concern-
ing the competence of courts to decide these cases.99 Because the 
facts and interests involved may be varied, and;J:he number of cases 
decided under the clause is so limited, framing an adequate and 
comprehensive standard of decision might be difficult.100 Moreover, 
when classified information is at issue a court may not be able to 
balance the interests adequately because of the unavailability of 
necessary data.101 Finally, in balancing the interests involved, courts 
would be required to decide whether or not to enforce different laws. 
As the Court in Branzburg said: "[Courts] would be making a value 
judgment that a legislature had declined to make .... "102 
Because of the difficulties inherent in a case-by-case approach, the 
only alternative to shutting off a qualitatively important source of 
information103 is an absolute immunity from questioning about 
sources, at least where the legislator is not himself involved in any 
criminal activity other than the receipt of the information. This 
approach is doctrinally justified to prevent the "indirect impair-
ment"104 of those activities at the core of the speech or debate clause 
-voting and speech-making. The immunity should here be ex-
97. 408 U.S. at 702. See also Note, supra note 80, at 340-41. 
98. 408 U.S. at 702. 
99. 408 U.S. at 705-06. See also Henkin, supra note 83, at 278-79. 
100. This problem was described in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207 (1962) as "a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" a controversy. 
But see Scharpf, supra note 34, at 555-58. 
IOI. See generally Scharpf, supra note 34, at 567-73. See also Henkin, supra note 
83, at 279. But see Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1225-26. In 
recognition of these problems, courts have left the decision of when information 
should be classified to the executive. See, e.g., Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). See generally Developments-National Security, supra, 
at 1221-27. 
102. 408 U.S. at 706. 
103. One other possible approach is embodied in S. 2965, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1971). This bill would create an expert bipartisan disclosure board that would sub-
poena upon request documents that an executive agency has refused to supply. The 
board would balance the interests at stake to determine whether and to what ex-
tent the documents should be released. The President would have the power to over-
rule the board, but his decision would be appealable to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. This proposal was discussed in Note, 86 HARv. 
L. REv. I, supra note 3, at 199-200. The proposal would not adequately solve the prob-
lem of congressional unawareness of many documents. See id. at 199 n.5. Also, it gives 
no recourse to the legislator whose perception of the public interest is out of step with 
t11at of the board. Finally, t11e process could be somewhat slow and cumbersome. 
104. "Indirect impairment" of congressional deliberations was the standard used by 
t11e court of appeals to determine the scope of the speecl1 or debate clause. United 
States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1972). 
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tended beyond the literal meaning of the words of the clause for the 
same reasons that the Court in Gravel extended it to cover legislative 
aides: "[T]he Court's consistent approach has been that to confine 
the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause to words spoken in 
debate would be an unacceptably narrow view . . . . Rather than 
giving the Clause a cramped construction, the Court has sought to 
implement its fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from 
executive and judicial oversight that realistically threaten to control 
his conduct as a legislator.105 This position is also supported by the 
relative importance of the competing interests in the contemporary 
world. As Professor Bernard Schwartz has noted: "The overriding 
peril of the present century [is] the superstate with its omnipotent 
administration, unrestrained by any checks on its all pervasive regu-
latory activities .... If the elected representatives assert the right to 
lay bare all that goes on within the executive, that danger may be 
avoided."106 
The scope of this legislative immunity should not be exaggerated. 
In spite of the importance of a legislative need for information, the 
line between protected and unprotected information gathering 
should be drawn to protect only those instances where the legislator 
is implicated merely in the receipt of information and not in any 
other alleged crime. Criminal conduct such as fraud or breaking 
and entering should not be protected even though the information 
gained may be relevant to legislative activities.107 A wider immunity 
would totally sacrifice the ultimate interests protected by the specific 
statutes under investigation-privacy, security of person and prop-
erty, and secrecy. Under an immunity limited to sources, however, 
these interests can still be protected to some extent, for the informant 
would still be liable for the original criminal conduct, and the limi-
tations on the immunity would deter the congressman's participation 
in the original criminal act. Additionally, Congress' interest in ac-
quiring information would be adequately secured by encouraging 
sources to divulge information through a source immunity, without 
the excessive costs inherent in an immunity for all criminal informa-
tion gathering acts. 
III. SHOULD PRIVATE REPUBLICATION BE IMMUNE? 
The Court's refusal to grant immunity to the efforts of Senator 
Gravel and his aide to have the Papers privately republished pre-
105. 408 U.S. at 617-18. 
106. Hearings on Availability of Information from Federal Departments and 
Agencies Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 84th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 465 (1956). 
107. Similarly, the immunity should not be e.xtended to include information 
gathering conduct violating an individual's constitutional right. A court should be 
allowed to balance the interests involved in such cases, as it has traditionally done. 
Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See generally Note, 86 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 1, supra note 3, at 200 n.58. 
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sents problems similar to those discussed above. Again, the basic 
inquiry is whether activity that normally takes place outside Con-
gress should be immune. Although many of the same interests are at 
stake, there is one important difference between this case and the 
question of immunity from questioning about sources: At the time 
of republication, clearly protected conduct, voting and speechmak-
ing, has already taken place. Immunity for republication, then, 
unlike that for questioning about sources, does not clearly facilitate 
these purely legislative acts.108 
The first question is whether republication should be considered 
a protected "legislative act" because it aids in the performance of 
the "informing function" of Congress. The informing function en-
compasses four very important interests. The first is the interest in 
an educated and informed citizenry.109 Information may be of public 
concern because it relates to bills pending before Congress or because 
it acquaints the public with the purposes and ideas of its elected 
representatives. 110 The legislature gathers and presents such informa-
tion about other branches of the government in its role as "watch-
dog."111 Although information conveyed by the legislature in per-
forming this function may be to some extent protected by the first 
amendment,112 because Congress plays a particularly important role 
in guiding, shaping, and informing public opinion113 society has a 
special interest in giving a protection to legislators beyond that 
accorded by the first amendment. 
A second interest to be promoted is the assurance that the legis-
lature will remain an independent center of power. The chief exec-
utive and his subordinates presently wield enormous influence in 
shaping public opinion on current issues and in encouraging public 
acquiescence in executive action. It should be noted that executive 
department heads and lower officials are protected by a judicially 
created immunity in many of their public communications.114 Be-
108. 408 U.S. at 625-26. 
109. This aspect of the informing function is discussed at length by Justice Bren-
nan. See 408 U.S. at 649-56. 
llO. W. WILSON, supra note 25, at 303. 
lll. See generally R. L'I.HR 8: J. THEIS, CONGRESS: POWER AND PURPOSE ON CAPITOL 
HILL 105-07 (1967); E. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS: ITS CoNTEMl'ORARY ROLE 109-23 (3d ed. 
1961). 
II2. See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 8-ll (Vintage ed. 1967). 
ll3. Led and checked by Congress, the prurient and fearless, because anonymous, 
animadversions of the Press, now so often premature and inconsiderate, might be 
disciplined into serviceable capacity to interpret and judge. Its energy and 
sagacity might be tempered by discretion, and strengthened by knowledge. One 
of our chief constitutional difficulties is that, in opportunities for informing and 
guiding public opinion, the freedom of the Press is greater than the freedom of 
Congress. 
W. WILSON, supra note 25, at 305-06. 
ll4. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 
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cause of present executive strength, the legislature must also be able 
to convey its viewpoint in order to build public support for its 
positions. The release of the Pentagon Papers is instructive in this 
regard; if the legislature had had access to and been able to dissemi-
nate earlier the contents of the Papers, the American involvement in 
Viet Nam brought about by the executive might have been contained. 
The third interest involved in the informing function is de-
scribed by Justice Brennan as the instillation in the people of con-
fidence in their govemment.115 This sense of security comes in part 
from the people's awareness of the activities and intentions of their 
representatives. To some extent it also comes from the people's 
knowledge that they are not totally powerless to affect either the 
legislators themselves or, through their legislators, the executive. In 
general, the dissemination of information by legislators, like all free 
expression, encourages the stability and consensus necessary for any 
political democracy. 
Fourth, there is a special interest to be served in allowing indi-
vidual legislators like Gravel to reach a wider audience despite the 
opposition of most or all of their fellow legislators. Underlying both 
the first amendment and the informing function is the notion that in 
a democracy even the lone dissenter's voice is a vital part of any 
public debate.116 To this end the immunity is conferred by the 
clause on individual legislators;117 even a maverick senator repre-
sents his constituents. It should also be noted that executive en-
croachment on Congress is likely to be most often directed at indi-
viduals, since it is more difficult and politically risky to attempt to 
intimidate a numerically large proportion of the legislature.118 
The legitimacy of the informing function is recognized in several 
legal mechanisms. In Gravel Justice Brennan pointed to the franking 
privilege, telephone and telegraph allowances, stationary allotments, 
and favorable prices on reprints from the Congressional Record as 
examples of instances where Congress has undertaken to perform 
(1896). See generally Handler &: Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits 
Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. R.Ev. 44 (1969). 
115. 408 U.S. at 651-52. 
116. See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 112, at 4-7. 
117. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 548-49 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
quoting Coffin v. Massachusetts, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1804): 
[I]t appears •.. that the privilege secured by [the clause] is not so much the 
privilege of the house as an organized body, as of each individual member com-
posing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will of the 
house. For he does not hold this privilege at the pleasure of the house; but 
derives it from the will of the people, expressed in the constitution, which is para-
mount to the will of either or both branches of the legislature. 
(emphasis added by Justice Brennan). 
118. See the discussion of congressional weapons that can be used against the 
executive in text accompanying notes 74-76 supra. 
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this function.119 The most prominent recognition of the function is 
the journal of proceedings clause of the Constitution.120 
Congress' ability to inform would be promoted if private repub-
lication were immunized. As Justice Brennan suggested,121 a "wider" 
audience is reached through republication by private means than by 
the Congressional Record, which very few citizens read regularly, or 
the newspapers, which cannot be depended upon to reprint in their 
entirety bulky, detailed reports like the Pentagon Papers.122 But even 
where the informing function has been recognized as a valid legisla-
tive task, its protection has been limited by competing interests. For 
example, in United States v. Rumely,123 Justice Frankfurter stated: 
Although the indispensable "informing function of Congress" is not 
to be minimized, determination of the "rights" which this function 
implies illustrates the common juristic situation thus defined for the 
Court by Mr. Justice Holmes: "all rights tend to declare themselves 
absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the 
neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on 
which the particular right is founded, and which become strong 
enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached."124 
There are four problems in extending the immunity granted by 
the speech or debate clause to republication. First, such an extension 
would be a serious break with precedent. While the famous English 
case Stockdale v. Hansard,125 cited by the Gravel majority,126 is not 
itself strong authority,127 two cases cited in Stockdale unequivocally 
hold that republication is not within the scope of the English speech 
or debate clause: The King v. Lord Abingdon,128 in which Abingdon 
republished at his own expense a House of Lord's speech that 
charged a Sherman of Gray's Inn with improper conduct, held that 
an action would lie for libel, although the words would not be 
punishable by the courts had they merely been delivered in Parlia-
I 19. 408 U.S. at 650. 
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 5. See generally Note, 81 YALE L.J. 188, supra note 3, at 
202-04. 
121. 408 U.S. at 649. 
122. In fact, the failure of the press to publish the more complete version of the 
Papers that Gravel had read into the subcommittee record was the factor that moti-
vated him to go to private book publishers. See S. UNGAR, supra note 6, at 268. 
123. 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (congressional committee had no power under authorizing 
resolution to compel disclosure of customers by seller of _"political" books). 
124. 345 U.S. at 43-44, quoting Hudson County Water Co. v. Mccarter, 209 U.S. 
349, 355 (1908). 
125. ll2 Eng. Rep. lll2 (Q.B. 1839). 
126. 408 U.S. at 622-24. 
127. See 408 U.S. at 658-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv 
125, supra note 3, at 147. 
128. 170 Eng. Rep. 337 (N.P. 1794). 
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ment, and The King v. Creevey129 held that a member of the House 
of Commons could be convicted for republishing a libelous speech 
made in the House of Commons. Justice Story's view of the scope 
of the speech or debate clause was in accord with this English prece-
dent: "[A]lthough a speech delivered in the house of commons is 
privileged, and the member cannot be questioned respecting it else-
where, yet, if he publishes his speech, and it contains libelous matter, 
he is liable to an action and prosecution therefor as in common cases 
of libel. And the same principles seem applicable to the privilege of 
debate and speech in Congress."130 
The two lower federal court cases that treated the question of 
private republication prior to Gravel followed these English deci-
sions. In Long v. Ansell,131 the court indicated that the immunity 
would not be a defense to a claim of libel against a senator who 
allowed copies of the Congressional Record containing allegedly 
defamatory speech to be circulated in the mails.132 And in McGovern 
v. Martz,133 it was held with regard to the defendant's counterclaim 
for libel that the absolute privilege to inform fellow legislators be-
comes a qualified privilege for republication by unofficial circulation 
of the Congressional Record;134 the legislator is privileged only if he 
does not act maliciously in circulating reprints or copies of the 
Record to congressmen.135 
These precedents may not be directly relevant to Gravel because 
they involve immunity from libel or slander, rather than from 
criminal prosecution. It could be argued that an exception should 
be made for actions like Gravel's because, unlike the slanderous 
expression in Long and McGovern, Gravel's conduct was directly 
related to a purpose of the clause-preserving the balance of power 
between the executive and legislative branches of the federal govern-
ment. 
However, the reason for the limitations on the immunity found 
in these precedents is equally applicable to Gravel. As Lord Denman 
indicated in Stockdale, that decision was based on the assumption 
that republication in general, unlike actual debate, was not intended 
to be immune.136 In Long, the immunity was not applied to repub-
lication because the "acts charged have only a remote connection 
129. 105 Eng. Rep. 102 (K.B. 1813). 
130. J. STORY, l COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 611 (4th ed. 1873). 
131. 69 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir.), afld., 293 U.S. 76 (1934). 
132. 69 F.2d at 389 (dictum). 
133. 182 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1960). 
134. 182 F. Supp. at 347. However, the privilege does extend to material inserted 
by a Congressman into the Congressional Record with the consent of the House or 
Senate, even if the material is not read on the floor. 182 F. Supp. at 347. 
135. 182 F. Supp. at 348. 
136. 112 Eng. Rep. at 1172. 
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with the speech."137 And in 1'.1.cGovern, it was stated that republica-
tion should not be given speech or debate immunity because the 
"reason for the rule--complete and uninhibited discussion among 
legislators-is not here served."138 Thus, although the speech-making 
and report-·writing clearly protected by the clause do incidentally 
inform the public, they are protected because they involve com-
munication with other legislators in the process of legislative deliber-
ation, not because they serve the informing function. This process 
is not served by republication outside the legislature, whether the 
laws involved protect individual reputations or national security. 
In Doe v. McMillan,139 decided after Gravel, the Supreme Court, 
in holding that there is no immunity for the Superintendent of 
Documents and the Public Printer when they print a subcommittee 
report ordered to be printed by Congress where the report infringes 
on important personal rights, found that the performance of the 
informing function was not essential to the legislative activity meant 
to be protected by the speech or debate clause.140 Doe demonstrates 
a judicial approach to the informing function consistent with that 
of the cases discussed above. 
The second justification for not extending the immunity to 
republication is that speeches outside the Congress, even those that 
merely repeat what was said within legislative chambers, are not 
afforded protection.141 Both these speeches and republication involve 
the communication of views by the legislator outside the halls of 
Congress and both similarly promote the informing function. 
The third problem with extending the immunity to private 
republication is that important competing interests would be sacri-
ficed. One kind of harm done would be to individual privacy and 
reputation.142 More important, an extension of the clause may seri-
ously impair those interests associated with the activities of the 
executive branch.143 The sacrifice of these interests was acceptable 
when dealing with an immunity for questioning about sources; 
however, the sacrifice may become unacceptable for an action not 
closely related to those activities at the core of the clause-voting 
and speechmaking within Congress. Although any argument that 
the national security was immediately endangered by the disclosure 
of the Pentagon Papers is doomed to failure,144 it is certainly not 
137. 69 F.2d at 389. 
138. 182 F. Supp. at 397 (emphasis original). 
139. 41 U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S., May 29, 1973). 
140. 41 U.S.LW. at 4755. 
141. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4755. 
142. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. 
143. See notes 82-90 supra and accompanying text. 
144. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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difficult to imagine a case in which the public release of secret 
information by a legislator would irreparably harm the national 
interest, especially in time of war.145 Even though the absence of 
legislative immunity does not guarantee that a congressman will not 
release such information outside Congress, disclosure is deterred be-
cause of the risk of criminal sanctions. 
Although these interests may be impaired to some extent by 
protected legislative expression within Congress, the potential for 
harm would be much greater if the privilege was extended, for re-
publication would lead to wider dissemination. Additionally, the 
opportunity for control by the legislature itself is much greater if 
the relevant conduct occurs within Congress or at official legislative 
functions. To some extent, members prone to misconduct will be 
discouraged, when within Congress, by informal social pressures and 
by formal rules from straying too far from the norm of responsible 
behavior.146 But legislators would be less amenable to such controls 
if activities outside the halls of Congress or its committee rooms 
were immunized, for Congress is ill-equipped to investigate, try, and 
punish its members for the wide range of activity that they may en-
gage in outside of Congress.147 
The fourth reason for not extending the immunity to republica-
tion is that there are other ways in which the dissemination of 
information to the public can be accomplished. Even if Senator 
Gravel could not get the newspapers to report fully his version of the 
Pentagon Papers, news about many of the proceedings of Congress 
are conveyed to the public through the Congressional Record, the 
newspapers, radio, and television. Moreover, republication would be 
deterred only in those few cases where there was a threat of criminal 
or civil liability. 
Furthermore, the refusal to extend the absolute immunity of the 
speech or debate clause to republication does not preclude the appli-
cation of a judicially fashioned immunity in civil cases similar to 
that for executive republication.148 The scope of this immunity could 
be defined with regard to the competing interests present in different 
kinds of cases. Although this approach has not as yet been accepted 
by the Supreme Court, it has been recognized in several lower court 
cases in which the speech or debate clause has been interpreted.140 
145. See note 92 supra. 
146. An even more important source of control comes from the enforcement of 
specific rules designed to protect the national security. See, e.g., the congressional rules 
against disclosing such information at note 92 supra. One of the historical assump• 
tions underlying the immunity for speech or debate in the legislature is that the 
Congress itself would retain the right, within limits, to discipline its members. See 
generally Cella, supra note 3, at 37-41. 
147. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 518 (1972). 
148. See note 114 supra. 
149. See, e.g., McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 347 (D.D.C. 1960); Methodist 
Fedn. for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1956). 
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Most importantly, as long as the legislators themselves have access 
to the information, the values ultimately promoted by the perfor-
mance of the informing function would not be greatly hindered, 
even if specific bits of data could not be conveyed to the public. As 
noted above,160 society's interest in legislative access to all of the 
facts is stronger than its interest in total access for the people at large 
because congressmen are immediately entrusted with the task of law-
making. Also, if the legislators are fully informed, they can to a 
considerable extent instruct public opinion as to the import of 
sensitive data even if they are unable to reveal details. 
Unfortunately, the interests of dissident legislators will be sacri-
ficed to some extent by not applying the clause to republication. It is 
true that such congressmen may be unable to express their views 
publicly when the immunity is thus limited: They are subject to the 
regular criminal and civil laws for communication outside Congress, 
and their opportunity to disseminate some kinds of information 
within the legislature itself could be constricted by the rules imposed 
by the majority. But the public expressions of minority legislators 
will not be totally cut off. To begin with, the criminal or civil laws 
and the rules of the legislature will deter them in only the few 
cases where the laws apply. Furthermore, they may still persuade the 
majority of legislators to change the rules to allow them to present 
the data within the Congress without penalty. And, even if the laws 
are not changed, under the first amendment doctrine of prior re-
straint101 they will almost always be able to reveal their information 
publicly if they are willing to risk subsequent conviction. Nonethe-
less, this cost of limiting the immunity is considerable. 
However, in sum, the majority's refusal to apply the immunity to 
private republication is a justifiable accommodation of strong com-
peting interests in accordance with the historic interpretation of the 
scope of the speech or debate clause. 
Even though both involve some act1v1ty outside the halls of 
Congress, there are several reasons for preferring immunity for 
questioning about sources over immunity for republication. First, 
the interest in access to information is greater for legislators than for 
average citizens. Second, many of the basic values promoted by re-
publication can be served to some extent without immunity as long 
as the legislature has the information in the first place. Third, the 
150. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra. 
151. Although the boundaries of the doctrine of prior restraint are not com-
pletely clear, at a minimum "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression ..• [bears] 
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). For a recent application of the doctrine, see New York Times v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF Ex-
PRESSION 503-12 (1970); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 I.Aw &: CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 6·18 (1955). 
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acquisition of relevant data is more directly related to the perfor-
mance of the law-making activity at the core of the speech or debate 
immunity than is republication. Fourth, the speech or debate clause 
has historically been interpreted to include immunity for sources 
and not republication. It should also be noted that the argument 
favoring immunity for questioning about sources is stronger if there 
is no immunity for republication, for the data acquired from sources 
is not as likely to be harmfully disseminated. For these reasons, the 
Court's interpretation of the immunity with respect to republication 
appears to be acceptable, but its failure to find an immunity for 
questioning about sources appears to be historically and practically 
unacceptable. 
